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a b s t r a c t
How firms set prices is key to understanding markets. Standard economics dictates that the fixed costs
of a firm should not affect its prices. Nonetheless, it is common practice for firms to raise their prices
after a fixed costs increase. We show that firms are correct in doing so if two ubiquitous conditions
apply: (i) future profits increase in current sales and (ii) firms are liquidity-constrained.
© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Economics textbooks teach us that the fixed costs of a firm
hould not affect its prices and quantities. Yet, there is consider-
ble evidence that firms incorporate fixed costs in their pricing
ecisions (e.g., Govindarijian and Anthony, 1983; Shim and Sudit,
995).
In this note, we show that firms can be right in doing so. The
asic idea is as follows. Consider a firm for which a higher output
oday means more profits in the future, for instance because of
witching costs. Consequently, the lifetime profit of the firm is
aximized at a lower price than the one that maximizes the
irm’s current profit. Suppose further that the firm is liquidity-
onstrained: it goes bankrupt if it incurs a loss during the current
eriod. The firm is, now, hit by a fixed costs shock. If its costs
ncrease to the point where the lifetime profit-maximizing price
ould lead to a loss, it is optimal for the firm to raise its price.
his shifts profits from the future to the current period, and helps
he firm to survive.
The two key conditions behind our argument are thus that
i) future profits increase in current sales and (ii) the firm is
liquidity-constrained. If either assumption is violated, there is no
impact of fixed costs on prices. We believe, however, that both
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kamphorst@ese.eur.nl (J. Kamphorst),
mendys@ceg-europe.com (E. Mendys-Kamphorst),
astian.westbrock@fernuni-hagen.de (B. Westbrock).ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109428
165-1765/© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.assumptions are valid in many contexts. There are many reasons
why future profits may increase in current sales, such as switch-
ing costs, brand loyalty, or learning by doing (e.g., Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988). An even larger body of empirical work has
demonstrated that the access to liquid assets can significantly
constrain the operational decisions of a firm (e.g., Borenstein and
Rose, 1995; Chevalier, 1995; Banerjee and Duflo, 2014).
Theories with a link between fixed costs and prices can be
found at several places in the economics literature. The earliest
theories date back to at least Baumol (1971). He showed that if
fixed costs are not yet sunk, then an increase of these costs can
cause the firm to choose a lower capacity and output, and a higher
price.1 More recent explanations have been offered by Brander
and Lewis (1986), Thépot and Netzer (2008), Janssen (2006),
and Janssen and Karamychev (2007). Nevertheless, there are at
least two important differences between these theories and ours.
First, in contrast to Baumol (1971), fixed costs affect prices in
our model even when they are sunk. Second, in contrast to all
the other theories, our argument is not dependent on demand
uncertainty, risk aversion, or the presence of multiple firms. We
thus offer a concise explanation for why fixed costs may affect
prices under quite general circumstances.2
1 Cabral and Riordan (1994) also consider avoidable fixed costs in a setting
where, like in our model, higher current demand increases future profits. They,
however, focus on competition and predatory incentives.
2 Although this is the first formalization of the explanation, we should
mention that the basic argument can already be found in Borenstein and Rose
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QThe following Sections 2–4 present our basic argument. In
Section 5, we show that the argument carries over to the case of
soft liquidity constraints, where a firm pays higher interest rates
over its debt when its debt increases. Section 6 concludes.
2. The basic model
Our model is a simplified version of the ones in Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1996) and Klemperer (1995, Section 5.2), where
liquidity-constrained firms sell to consumers with switching costs.
Consider a monopolist, active in two periods. In each period
t ∈ {1, 2}, the monopolist chooses the quantity Qt and earns the
profit πt that is equal to operational profits, π ot , minus fixed costs,
t . Key to our story, the second-period profit depends positively
n the first-period output,
∂π◦2 (Q1,Q2)
∂Q1
> 0.
lso, the firm goes bankrupt unless it makes at least a profit of B
n t = 1 (where B may be negative). The lifetime profit function
f the firm is thus given by
(Q1,Q2) =
{
π o1 (Q1)− F1 + δ
[
π o2 (Q1,Q2)− F2
]
if π1 ≥ B,
0 otherwise,
here 0 < δ < 1 denotes the discount factor on profits made in
= 2.
Our plan is to show that the monopolist may rationally in-
rease its price after an increase of F1. To keep things simple,
e therefore assume that the profit function has the following
ommon properties. Each per-period profit function is twice dif-
erentiable, strictly concave, and single-peaked in that period’s
uantity. Hence, there exists a unique, positive Q ∗1 that maximizes
irst-period profits. Similarly, for any Q1 there exists a unique∗
2 (Q1) that maximizes second-period profits. In addition, the un-
onstrained lifetime profit function, π o1 (Q1)−F1+δ[π o2 (Q1,Q2)−
2], is twice differentiable, strictly concave, and single-peaked
t a unique, positive pair
(
Q ∗∗1 ,Q
∗∗
2
)
, where obviously Q ∗∗2 =∗
2
(
Q ∗∗1
)
.
Our final assumptions restrict the attention to the most inter-
sting case. First, there exists a Q1 such that π o1 (Q1) − F1 > B.
his ensures that the firm can survive the first period if it wants
o. Second, there exists a pair (Q1,Q2) such that Π (Q1,Q2) > 0.
his ensures that the firm wants to survive if it can. Third, there
xists a Q2 > 0 such that π◦2 (Q
∗
1 ,Q2)− F2 > 0. This ensures that
he firm produces in the second period if it survives.
. Optimal strategy
In t = 2, the firm maximizes current profits, given that it is
till in business. The first-order condition gives
∗
2 (Q1) :
∂π o2
(
Q1,Q ∗2
)
∂Q2
= 0.
n t = 1, the firm maximizes total discounted profits. Let Q B1 be
he highest quantity such that π o1 (Q1) − F1 ≥ B.3 By the strict
oncavity of π o1 (Q1), it follows that for any Q1 > Q
B
1 the firm
ill go bankrupt. Moreover, because the firm can survive the first
eriod if it wants to, we have Q B1 > Q
∗
1 .
(1995) and Chevalier (1995). Our net contribution is thus the formalization,
which the literature failed to pick up on. Our second contribution is to show
that the link between fixed costs and prices also holds up when the liquidity
constraint is soft.
3 When B = 0, Q B1 is thus the break-even output, where the price P(Q B1 ) is
equal to the firm’s average total cost.Next, we show that also the optimal, non-liquidity-constrained
quantity satisfies Q ∗∗1 > Q
∗
1 . By the Envelope Theorem, Q
∗∗
1 solves
∂Π
(
Q ∗∗1 ,Q
∗
2
(
Q ∗∗1
))
∂Q1
= 0 ⇔ ∂π
o
1
(
Q ∗∗1
)
∂Q1
+ δ ∂π
o
2
(
Q ∗∗1
)
∂Q1
= 0.
As Q ∗1 solves ∂π
o
1
(
Q ∗1
)
/∂Q1 = 0, and because ∂π o2 (Q1) /∂Q1 > 0
for all Q1, we immediately arrive at the claim. Intuitively, Q ∗∗1
exceeds Q ∗1 because marginally increasing Q1 at Q
∗
1 does not
affect first-period profits but does increase second-period profits.
At Q ∗∗1 , the loss in first-period profits by marginally increasing
Q1 exactly offsets the increase in the discounted second-period
profits.
It follows from the above that the liquidity constraint is bind-
ing if and only if Q B1 < Q
∗∗
1 . Therefore, the optimal first-period
quantity, Qmax1 , is given by Q
max
1 = Q ∗∗1 if Q ∗∗1 ≤ Q B1 , and Qmax1 =
B
1 otherwise.
. The role of fixed costs
Knowing Qmax1 , we now consider how it is affected by a fixed
osts increase. Let the fixed costs increase from F1 to F ′1 and let
B′
1 denote the highest quantity such that π
o
1 (Q
B′
1 ) − F ′1 ≥ B. Of
ourse, Q B1 > Q
B′
1 because first-period profits decline in Q1 for any
1 > Q ∗1 . There are three possible outcomes:
First, Q ∗∗1 ≤ Q B′1 . In this case, the optimal quantity Qmax1 was
nd remains Q ∗∗1 . The liquidity constraint still has no bite, and the
irm can choose its unconstrained first-best quantity. This is the
tandard result, where fixed costs have no impact on the optimal
uantity or price.
Second, fixed costs increase so much that bankruptcy becomes
navoidable. This is the case when π o1
(
Q ∗1
)− F ′1 < B.
Third, Q ∗1 ≤ Q B′1 < Q ∗∗1 . This is the case we are interested
n. Here, the increase in the fixed costs tightens the liquidity
onstraint, reduces the quantity to Q B
′
1 , and therefore increases
he price. This third case is thus consistent with the claim that
fixed cost increase might necessitate an increase in prices for
firm to stay in business. Lifetime profits are reduced for two
easons. The first is the higher fixed costs, and the second is
hat the firm cannot afford to invest as much in future profits
s before.
. Soft liquidity constraints
Above, we assumed a hard liquidity constraint. The firm went
ankrupt if it failed to make sufficient profits. Here, we consider
he more common case of a soft liquidity constraint: a firm pays
igher interest rates if its debt increases. Also in this case, a fixed
osts increase can result in a higher price.
As before, let Q ∗1 maximize first-period profits, ∂π
o
1 (Q
∗
1 )/∂Q1 =
, and let Q ∗2 (Q1) maximize second-period profits, ∂π
o
2
(
Q1,Q ∗2
)
/
Q2 = 0. Let Dt be the firm’s outstanding debt at the beginning of
eriod t ∈ {1, 2}. This debt needs to be refinanced at the start of
he next period . D1 is exogenously given. D2 depends, in contrast,
n D1 and the first period’s profits in the following way:
2 (D1, π1) =
[
1+ r1
]
D1 + F1 − π o1 ,
here rt ≡ r (Dt) denotes the interest rate that is due at the end
f period t . That interest rate shall increase in the outstanding
ebt, ∂r (Dt) /∂Dt > 0. The firm’s lifetime profit function is thus
iven by
(Q1,Q2) = π o1 (Q1)− F1− r1D1+ δ
[
π o2 (Q1,Q2)− F2− r2D2
]
. (1)
Consider, now, the first-period quantity that maximizes life-
ime profits, Qmax1 . As in the case of a hard liquidity constraint,
max > Q ∗. To see this, consider Q = Q ∗. Then, selling1 1 1 1
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dmarginally more does not affect current profits. Therefore, selling
marginally more does not increase D2. Because future profits do
increase in current sales, ∂π o2 (Q1) /∂Q1 > 0, however, it follows
that the optimal first-period quantity is strictly larger than Q ∗1 , so
∂Π
(
Q ∗1 ,Q
∗
2
(
Q ∗1
))
/∂Q1 > 0 and Qmax1 > Q
∗
1 .
In particular, it follows from the first-order condition of (1),
that Qmax1 satisfies
∂
∂Q1
π o2
(
Qmax1 ,Q
∗
2
(
Qmax1
))
= −1
δ
∂π o1
∂Q1
+ ∂D2
∂π o1
∂π o1
∂Q1
r2 + ∂r2
∂D2
∂D2
∂π o1
∂π o1
∂Q1
D2. (2)
On the left-hand side, we see the benefit of selling marginally
more, namely the positive impact on future operational profits.
On the right-hand side, we see the costs of selling marginally
more, namely (i) the reduction in current profits; (ii) the interest
hat has to be paid on the additional first-period losses; and (iii)
he additional payments on the outstanding debt at the end of
eriod two due to higher interest rates.
Fixed costs affect the optimal strategy through effects (ii)
nd (iii). Ceteris paribus, higher current fixed costs imply higher
uture debt and therefore higher future interest rates. The higher
he interest rate, the more a firm pays per unit of debt, and the
ess willing it is to take on additional debt by lowering current
rofits. This is effect (ii). Effect (iii) comprises two separate ef-
ects. The first effect is simple. Any increase in interest rate is
ore costly the higher the debt is. Therefore, the firm is less will-
ng to incur additional debt after a fixed costs increase. However,
f the responsiveness of the interest rate to debt changes as the
ebt increases, ∂2r2/∂ (D2)2 ̸= 0, then this responsiveness is a
onsideration as well. It matters to the firm if a unit of additional
ebt has a large effect on its interest rate or a small effect. The
arger the effect is, the larger is ∂r2/∂D2, and the more costly an
dditional unit of debt is. Combining this with the earlier effects,
t follows that the firm may in fact choose a more competitive
trategy if fixed costs increase, but only if ∂2r2/∂ (D2)2 is negative
nough. Hence, ∂2r2/∂ (D2)2 ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for the
rice to strictly increase as a result of higher fixed costs.
We now show this formally: let Π ′ denote the first-order
erivative of Π with respect to Q1 (see Eq. (2)). Because the firm
ptimally adjusts to any fixed costs change, Eq. (2) holds for any
1. Therefore, the total derivative of (2) with respect to F1 and Q1
s equal to zero:
∂Π ′
∂F1
dF1 + ∂Π
′
∂Q1
dQ1 = 0 ⇔ dQ1dF1 = −
∂Π ′
∂F1
∂Π ′
∂Q1
When will an increase in fixed costs decrease the optimal output,
so dQ1/dF1 < 0? We know that ∂Π ′/∂Q1 < 0 because Π is
concave in Q1. Therefore, the relevant condition is ∂Π ′/∂F1 < 0,
or equivalently
− δ
[
∂D2
∂π o1
∂π o1
∂Q1
]
∂r2
∂D2
∂D2
∂F1
− δ
[
∂r2
∂D2
∂D2
∂π o1
∂π o1
∂Q1
]
∂D2
∂F1
− δ ∂
2r2
∂ [D2)2
∂D2
∂F1
[
∂D2
∂π o1
∂π o1
∂Q1
D2
]
< 0.By ∂D2/∂π o1 = −1 and ∂D2/∂F1 = 1, we obtain
2
∂r2
∂D2
∂π o1
∂Q1
+ ∂
2r2
∂ (D2)2
∂π o1
∂Q1
D2 < 0.
Moreover, since ∂π o1/∂Q1 < 0 is negative, while ∂r2/∂D2 and D2
re positive, we get ∂Π ′/∂F1 < 0 if and only if
∂2r2
∂ (D2)2
> − 2
D2
∂r2
∂D2
.
As the right-hand side is negative, it follows that ∂2r2/∂ (D2)2 ≥ 0
s a sufficient condition for ∂Π ′/∂F1 < 0.
This shows that our results do not require a hard liquidity
onstraint. As long as interest rates depend positively on a firm’s
ebt and ∂2r2/∂ (D2)2 is not ‘too negative’, higher fixed costs lead
to higher prices.
6. Conclusion
In this note, we bridge a long-standing gap between standard
economic theory, according to which a firm’s fixed costs should
not affect its prices, and business practice, where many firms do
take fixed costs into account when setting prices. In contrast to
earlier theories on the topic, ours also applies both in case of sunk
costs and in the absence of competition.
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